“If you want to destroy my sweater, hold this thread as I walk away.”
In their 1994 hit song “Undone”, California indie rockers Weezer related a simple recipe for destroying wool cardigans. Some twenty years later, the song could equally apply to the state of Cold War-era international arms control agreements.
Last week arms control policy experts from the United States’ Department of State landed in Moscow to discuss allegations of Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the renewed specter of nuclear conflict in Europe occurring on the backdrop of fighting in Ukraine.
The INF Treaty was considered a landmark of arms control cooperation when it was signed in 1987. Verification tools established to ensure accountability with the treaty helped forge trust toward cooperation on other arms control negotiations, and helped ensure security in Europe during post-Soviet demilitarization. The treat remains an important cornerstone of East-West security cooperation, even if, as some in Russia believe, the pact is outdated by modern global strategic threats.
Russian officials have sought an end to INF for some time: in 2007 Putin remarked that then-general secretary of the CPSU Gorbachev’s decision to sign the treaty was “debatable to say the least.”
Putin went on to state that geopolitical threats necessitate reevaluation of Cold War-era treaties: “it will be difficult for us to keep within the framework of the treaty in a situation where other countries develop such weapons systems, and among those are countries in our near vicinity.” During the late 1980s the Soviet Union faced the threat of theater-nuclear weapons from NATO countries. INF ensured a system of ‘trust-but-verify’ between the potential belligerents, however since 1987 this threat has grown to include China, Pakistan, India, and even North Korea, all of whom are not parties to the treaty. Facing such proliferation of theater-nuclear weapons, Moscow has been itching to shift defense strategies.
The Violations: Nuclear He-said, She-said
Accusations of Russian violations of INF began with a 2008 missile test. Details remain varied and indeterminate, however arms control experts believe that Russia tested missiles using a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) system. INF prohibits development or use of GLCMs, mobile TELs or static sites, however naval assets are acceptable under the treaty.
Allegations remain unspecified and details scant: the Department of State has not disclosed details of US accusations, however because official response to the 2008 incident did not occur until 2011, some experts believe the allegations are based on information gathered through verified intelligence. Years of digging must have turned up something, as last July US national security heads unanimously declared the suspect test to be a serious violation of INF.
So far Russian officials have denied the claim, instead rebuffing the United States for its own INF violations and renewed complaints regarding the 2002 withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. Russian officials claim Hera rockets used by the US for testing anti-ballistic missile systems violate terms set in INF due to their 1,100km range. The claim is plausible based on range alone, however the US claims Hera rockets are merely repurposed boosters from dismantled banned missiles, allowed under Article 7 of INF. The Hera rocket uses two stages of the Minuteman II missile, and guidance systems recovered from Pershing II IRBMs destroyed for INF compliance. Furthermore, the US claims Hera rockets do not carry payloads, and as such cannot be used as offensive weapons, thereby not qualifying as IRBMs for INF compliance.
Moscow claims the Article 7 provisions were intended to repurpose IRBM parts for civilian research and development, namely in space programs, and as such violates the spirit of the agreement. Moscow also claims that US plans to install Mk-41 Aegis missile defense systems in Poland and Romania violate INF as the Mk-41 can be used to fire IRBM cruise missiles as well as the short-range interceptors in its intended ABM role.
Accusations: So What Happened?
Rumors about the violations are myriad. Media sources focused on the launch of an RS-26 ICBM with half its compliment of fuel, thereby shortening the missile’s maximum range to fall within the 500-5,000km limits of INF. Such a test did occur, however the RS-26 is considered an ICBM and accounted for as such under 2010’s NewSTART strategic missile restrictions. Arms control experts consider the development of ICBM intermediate-range targeting by undershooting maximum range a circumvention of INF rather than a violation. Such development actually increases the utility of NewSTART– any ICBMs used as makeshift IRBMs represent less intercontinental threat to the US and allies.
In April 2014, Rep. Brad Sherman stated that the alleged violation of INF was from testing SLBMs on ground launchers rather than naval or test launching systems. Other sources alleged the tests were of the R-500 Iskander-K missile, which appears very similar to the SS-N-21 SLBM. The R-500 is thought to have a range of 500km although Russian sources claim it is designed for 400-480km, similar to the Iskander-M model.
Photos taken in June 2014 appear to show Iskander -M and -K missile canisters to mobile ground launchers of the 26th Missile Brigade at the Luga garrison, Leningrad Oblast (the garrison is 87 miles south of St. Petersburg, and forms part of the ring of defenses for Moscow). Similar photos were taken of missile transfers to the 114th Missile Brigade in Astrakhanskaya Oblast, extending Russian IRBM cruise missile reach into both southern and northern Europe, if true.
No official word has come from the Obama administration regarding any of these incidents as pertains to the INF violations. The Department of State released an arms control and nonproliferation agreements compliance report July 2014. The report listed the following statement as findings of treaty non-compliance:
“The United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.”
The report’s analysis focuses on testing of intermediate-range cruise missiles from ground-launchers, listing provisions from Articles I, IV, VI, and VII, although the report merely reiterates the language of the treaty, not specifics of the violations.
Rattling Nuclear Sabers
Amidst the backdrop of NATO encroachment, Crimea annexation, fighting in Ukraine, and concerns regarding INF Treaty violations, Russia conducted a test-firing of an RSM-56 SLBM Bulava missile this September. The test took place the same week Russian President Vladimir Putin declared nuclear modernization programs, complete with tacit threat: “Russia will counter military moves by the US and NATO with an array of new nuclear and conventional weapons.” Putin recently pressed the Russian defense industry to reorganize and focus on in-house production capability rather than relying on weapons components from international suppliers. Part of the new focus are offensive and defensive systems to ensure a “guaranteed nuclear deterrent.”
The violations add to an already unstable political situation in Eastern Europe. “A weapon capability that violates the INF, that is introduced into the greater European land mass, is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with,” NATO commander GEN Breedlove stated. Russia relies on its aging Soviet-era nuclear forces to maintain strategic defense and parity with NATO’s conventional forces and technological superiority. Nuclear forces are an integral part of the Russian military defense, rather than as strategic insurance policy. As security threats continue to emerge on Russian borders, the prospect of developing theater-nuclear weapons grows more attractive: “I want to remind you that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations,” Putin stated as NATO and the EU deliberated military involvement in the Ukraine crisis. “It’s best not to mess with us,” the Russian president warned, engaging in not-so subtle atomic diplomacy.
American Congressional response so far has favored bringing Russia back into compliance with treaties via sanctions and international mediation, if for no other reason than to force Moscow to be the party that initiates official withdrawal from the INF. Some members of Congress are not so interested in diplomacy, however. In July, Senators Marco Rubio, Jim Risch, and Orrin Hatch introduced legislation aimed at initiating US research on new intermediate-range cruise missiles (S. 2725), thus effectively scrapping INF and empowering Russian weapon development in a childish act of tit-for-tat. The foolishness of such response was noted by Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergey Ivanov: “the Americans have no need for this class of weapon [for defense] . . . they could theoretically only attack Mexico and Canada with them.”
Stuff That Goes Bang 