Regional Safeguards Regimes: ABACC and Nonproliferation in the Southern Cone

Regional nuclear safeguards regimes offer a unique way for countries to partner with each other to ensure nuclear security and prevent proliferation. Such regimes act as check and balances between potential nuclear competitors, offering a means of cooperation rather than an arms development race that can spiral into conflict. These partnerships allow more peaceful research, development, and sharing among the participants, and can even act as impetus to end research and development of nuclear weapons.

Regional safeguards treaties between states outside of the NPT framework can be effective extensions of nonproliferation for states not ready or willing to adopt full-scope IAEA safeguards. This paper illustrates the development of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials regional safeguards agency and bilateral policies developed by regional partners, from impetus for agreement, initial treaty, and development of the safeguards regime over time.

ABACC and Nonproliferation in the Southern Cone

Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil represents a lengthy chain of agreements and declarations beginning in 1980, years before military tensions subsided between the states. International influences on Southern Cone cooperation such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Latin American Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (LANWFZ), and Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) cannot be marginalized, however when taking a closer look at individual states and governments, motivations are anything but transparent. Understanding the mechanisms driving or hindering nonproliferation in any particular region or country comprises many variables: regional threats, allies and security agreements, global nonproliferation regimes, economics, dominance power politics, internal regime politics, national pride, et cetera ad infinitum. Global international organizations or “big-power” sponsors can affect policies of nuclear weapon-seeking states, however the “big-power” states themselves may present a strategic threat, and global programs face “outsider” paradigms interpreted as imposition on national sovereignty or cultural values.

Regional safeguards treaties between states outside of the NPT framework can be effective extensions of nonproliferation for states not ready or willing to adopt full-scope IAEA safeguards. This paper illustrates the development of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials regional safeguards agency and bilateral policies developed by regional partners, from impetus for agreement, initial treaty, and development of the safeguards regime over time.

Pathways to Nonproliferation: Treaty of Tlatelolco

During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Latin American countries began to take note of the potential collateral damage resulting from Cold War nuclear aggression, especially the superpowers’ willingness to fight such battles in so-called client states. Nuclear war grew from an indirect threat to stark reality.

Envisioning an endless bipolar balance resting on mutually assured destruction preventing effective disarmament, several Latin American states took action without waiting for superpower sponsors. Using the 1961 Antarctic Treaty that established a nuclear weapons-free zone on the southern continent as example, “at the seventeenth regular session of the [UN] General Assembly, during the October Cuban missile crisis, a draft resolution calling for such a zone was submitted by Brazil and supported by Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador.”[1] Latin and South American states sought to codify similar restrictions in what would become known as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The final document was signed on 14 February 1967 in the Tlatelolco suburb of Mexico City. The Tlatelolco Treaty not only established states as nuclear weapons-free zones, but did so a year before the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed. The NPT provided important legal mechanisms leading to nonproliferation treaties, however the Treaty of Tlatelolco would prove more integral to the formation of regional safeguards (Argentina did not sign the NPT until 1995, four years after the establishment of ABACC; Brazil waited even longer, signing the treaty in 1998); for brevity, the NPT is not covered in this paper.

In addition to nonproliferation significance, the LANWFZ’s language and intent greatly influenced Argentina and Brazil while drafting the Bilateral Agreement. First, the treaty forbid member states “testing, using, manufacturing, production, or acquisition by any means whatsoever, receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons”[2] (although it did not rule against peaceful nuclear explosive devices). The regional prohibition sought to limit superpower interference with Protocols I and II, representing an important expression to resist Cold War bipolarity by non-nuclear weapon and non-aligned states. Both the principle of self-prohibition and self-determination represented in the treaty became important norms for cultural and political acceptance of nonproliferation regimes.

The Treaty is overseen by a non-state entity, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, or OPANAL, empowered to act on legal issues pertaining to the treaty and represent member states to third parties in legal matters, similar to the structures that would become of ABACC.

The Treaty was ground-breaking when drafted, however it receives criticism due to a peculiar waiver structure. The treaty only entered force once all member-states deposited articles of ratification, Additional Protocol I signed and ratified by “all extracontinental and continental States having de jure or de facto international responsibility for territories situated in the zone of application of the Treaty;”[3] and “signature and ratification of the Additional Protocol II annexed to this Treaty by all powers possessing nuclear weapons.”[4] OPANAL had little enforcement power over the superpowers needed to file Additional Protocol agreements. It was thought the unlikeness of obtaining superpower agreements to allow the treaty to enter into force would also discourage Latin American states from bothering.

To entice states to sign the treaty a waiver clause was written into Article 28 (Entry into Force): “all signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part, the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph . . . For those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall enter into force upon deposit of the declaration, or as soon as those requirements have been met which have not been expressly waived.”[5] The waiver structure essentially allowed states to participate in the NWFZ on the honor-code. Because the treaty itself required all potential participants to ratify the treaty before entering into force states could develop nuclear weapons without restriction. For example Brazil (the initial treaty sponsor before the UN General Assembly), signed the treaty on 9 May 1967, and deposited ratification documents on 29 January 1968, along with its waiver. Brazil remained in compliance with the treaty while running a covert nuclear program, because the treaty could not enter into force (Cuba held out until 2002).[6]

The Bilateral Agreement

The Treaty of Tlatelolco and LANWFZ provided a cultural norm pertaining to nuclear weapons in the Southern Cone. Although still viewed as important assets for strategic security by some states, development of weapons was directly contrary to the spirit of the NWFZ and attitude of empowerment for non-aligned states. This norm did not stop Argentine and Brazilian governments from developing nuclear weapon programs, but did provide an alternate means to maintain political legitimacy without them.

An initial agreement between Brazil and Argentina on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was reached in 1980, marking the first official nuclear cooperation between the countries. Five years passed before the southern nuclear thaw truly began with the Joint Declarations on Nuclear Policy talks in 1985. Increasing cooperation during the yearly conventions led to an official invitation to visit Argentina’s gaseous diffusion enrichment plant at Pilcaniyeu in 1987. One year later Brazil returned the favor and invited the Argentine delegation to the Aramar ultra-centrifuge facility.[7] By 1990 the two governments paved the way for creation of a regional nuclear safeguards agency with the publication of the Joint Statement of Buenos Aires and Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu.[8]

On 18 July 1990, less than one year after the initial declarations, the Republic of Argentina and Federative Republic of Brazil signed the Bilateral Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (Bilateral Agreement). The Agreement outlined a commitment to use nuclear materials for peaceful energy purposes while prohibiting diversion of materials, the development, or use of nuclear weapons. To this end, the Agreement established a framework of state-level safeguards called the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) to be applied by both countries’ nuclear energy administrations. To implement the safeguards and verify facilities and nuclear materials inventory, an independent regional agency was formed– the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).[9]

The SCCC was designed as a system of full-scope safeguards to be nationally implemented and centrally verified with the goal of preventing the diversion of nuclear material or facilities pertaining to nuclear materials, into weapons development, as outlined in Article I of the Bilateral Agreement.[10] The SCCC was outlined in the Annex Article I of the Agreement, mandating methods for evaluating materials and inventory surveillance and containment systems, based on the EURATOM safeguards agreement as a general model, however with some notable differences. Forecasting a future nuclear-powered navy, Article IV specified nuclear materials could be temporarily removed from the inspection regime in the event they were used in for development of vehicle propulsion.[11] Also of note, the Agreement established safeguards on nuclear facilities and potential nuclear facilities, perhaps wary of the events unfolding in Iraq, or cognoscente of Brazil’s own covert nuclear weapon “parallel program” established by the former military regime which nearly bankrupted the nation’s nuclear industry in the 1980s.[12] Whatever the reason, the Agreement filled a loophole in IAEA safeguards that would not be addressed until 1993. The Agreement was also likely influenced by the 1974 Indian nuclear test and the (then recently publicized) 1989 South African nuclear breakout, going one step beyond even the Treaty of Tlatelolco[13] and specifically banning development or use of peaceful nuclear devices or explosions in Article I, paragraph 3.[14]

As previously mentioned, in order to verify the implementation of SCCC in both states, Article VI of the Bipartite Agreement established ABACC as an international oversight agency. ABACC was empowered to conduct inspections of SCCC compliance, represent treaty parties before third-parties as pertaining to SCCC, and to take legal action as necessary to ensure or enforce safeguards compliance.[15]

The organization consists of a four-person Commission acting as governing body empowered to issue regulations, and the Secretariat acting as executive body.[16] Under the Agreement ABACC is recognized as an international organization and its employees, drawn from both Argentina and Brazil, are considered international civil servants for the duration of their employment.[17] ABACC maintains between 60-85 inspectors, drawn from the national nuclear agencies of their respective states to fill temporary positions within the agency. Inspection teams generally pair an expert in safeguards with a facility specialist to allow one inspector to focus on administrative and inventory protocols while the other partner evaluates specific facility designs and containment/surveillance measures. Teams are tasked with inspecting facilities in their opposite nation, incentivizing accurate and thorough inspections.[18] This system also allows inspectors to gain a more comprehensive understanding of procedures and systems that can be used to improve or streamline safeguards elements in home facilities.[19]

Although ABACC is an international organization, it relies on the state national authorities for the bureaucratic processes that schedule inspections and disseminate information or regulations. These processes require the states to maintain “well-developed national authorities”[20] to fulfill both state-level obligations and the transnational support ABACC requires to operate. The process helps to coordinate nuclear agencies in both states while keeping ABACC closely aligned to the states rather than developing into an external agency directing state functions without national input.

The national authorities also directly interact with ABACC on safeguards. Under SCCC directives, the national agencies must submit an initial inventory of all nuclear materials and facilities design information. ABACC then conducts an initial inventory inspection and design verification to establish a baseline for future comparison. The Secretariat prepares attachments for each facility based on initial inspections that determine when and how ABACC is allowed access. The attachments are filed with facility operators through the instruments of the national authorities.[21]

The Quadpartite Agreement

The early 1990s were hectic years for nonproliferation as new threats emerged challenging international safeguards. Revelations of weapons in South Africa, a development program in Iraq, troubles with North Korea, and a host of newly nuclear weapon-states emerging from the post-Soviet disintegration of Eastern Europe threatened to destabilize the global nonproliferation regime. Proceeding from military rivals to nuclear partners within a decade was an impressive feat for Argentina and Brazil, however the Bilateral Agreement left members of the international community with concerns regarding ambiguities raised by specific articles in the treaty, in particular Annex Article IV.

Annex Article IV was included in the Bilateral Agreement to support naval development. Brazil particularly expressed interest in developing a nuclear submarine fleet powered by domestic uranium stocks. As such, the article read:

            “the application of nuclear materials used for the nuclear propulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, or in other activities which, by their nature, require a special procedure shall have the following special characteristics: a. the suspension of inspections, of access to operational accounting records, and of notifications and reports required under the SCCC in relation to these nuclear materials for the duration of their use…”[22]

The Argentine and Brazilian governments were satisfied with the verification instrument established by the Agreement, however key international nuclear suppliers such as Germany, Canada, and the United States raised concerns that the article might allow for facilities used to process or store special material removed from safeguards to also forgo inspections. Critics claimed entire enrichment facilities could be removed from safeguards under the clause, breaking continuity of knowledge of the materials. Pressure from international nuclear suppliers to accept IAEA safeguards resulted in concurrent negotiations with the Agency while the Bilateral Agreement continued to be drafted, as much from national pride as pragmatism.

The Bilateral Agreement negotiations proved faster than those with the IAEA, resulting in a signed treaty by July 1991. By the time negotiations with the IAEA neared completion, ABACC had been created under the Bilateral Agreement.[23] ABACC is specifically charged with representing the state parties before third parties in legal matters, so the framework agreement with the IAEA was expanded to include the new agency, resulting in a Quadpartite Agreement (QPA), signed in December of 1991 as the Bilateral Agreement entered into force.[24]

The QPA assumes cooperation between ABACC and the IAEA in implementing IAEA safeguards on the states as negotiated. The states agree to accept application of safeguards on all nuclear activities, for the sole purpose of verifying nuclear materials are not diverted to weapons programs. The IAEA undertakes to ensure that safeguards are applied in accordance with the terms of the agreement, while ABACC applies its safeguards and cooperates with the IAEA. The IAEA applies safeguards to allow verification of the SCCC (performed by ABACC), and to monitor ABACC to ensure compliance and capability.[25] IAEA safeguards cover the relationship between a facility and Agency, however SCCC safeguards cover relationships between facility operator and state, and between state and ABACC. The legal obligations of both states remain nearly unchanged, and equivalent to INFCIRC/153 safeguards.[26]

The QPA is modeled after the EURATOM/IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193). Verification procedures remained much the same as previously with ABACC working through national authorities, however general procedures were brought into alignment with INFCIRC/153 as needed. This removed the Annex Article IV loophole of the Bipartite Agreement. Article XIII (Special Provisions) allows a state to remove materials from safeguards, however only the materials themselves are exempt from safeguards, and only after notification to the IAEA of intent and certification that use will not interfere with any previous safeguards agreement, including INFCIRC/66. Also, the Agency will be kept informed of the total quantity and disposition of the material or conditions of export. This information will be used to track the material once it is returned to safeguards from the temporary use.[27]

Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the QPA is Article 71 (Special Inspections) provisions. The Agency is allowed to conduct special inspections in order to verify special reports requested from ABACC if there is reason to believe nuclear material is unaccounted for. Special inspections may also be undertaken if the Agency determines information from routine inspections is insufficient to fulfill its responsibilities.[28] The provision is intended not to overrule ABACC, but as a measure proceed with verification in the event state interference limits ABACC’s ability to provide the necessary information.

In such cases determined to be “urgent”, the Agency may request access to the facility in question as well as facilities not included in the routine application of inspections through the state party and ABACC, likely influenced by experiences with Iraq building covert nuclear facilities within portions of facilities under safeguards. Refusal of an “urgent” action allows the Agency to act without entering arbitration.

The state parties have never formally objected to Article 71 provisions, but Brazil has taken issue with the IAEA several times relating to the scope and location of inspections. In 2004 Brazil refused IAEA inspectors access to centrifuge components in the Resende uranium enrichment plant, claiming protection for proprietary industrial secrets.[29] The event was likely initiated over objections to IAEA requests for full access inspections, but rooted in deeper sovereignty concerns.

Role of Regional Authorities

Brazil historically viewed mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear technology development as a source of national pride, codified as domestic nuclear development in both its constitution and national defense strategy (to provide security through energy independence) while remaining wary of outside interference.

Prior to the development of the Bilateral Agreement, nuclear weapons were viewed in much the same light. According to former ambassador Thomas Graham Jr.:

            “Brazil has always had somewhat of an interest in nuclear weapons, seeing them as representing freedom from big power dominance– and Brazil, after, all should be seen as a big power itself, many Brazilians believe. President Lula in his first campaign said that what Brazil needs is “respect” and opined that the only way to gain respect in this world is to acquire nuclear weapons. Argentina has never had this kind of fixation, in my view, their program being more a response to Brazil than a claim to great power status.”[30]

Brazil also views itself as a world leader in nuclear development and champion of national sovereignty, as well as heading the New Agenda Coalition dedicated to pressuring nuclear weapon states to fulfill their NPT obligations regarding disarmament. Clashes between Iran and the IAEA in 2004 drew heated commentary from Brazil regarding states’ rights under the NPT.[31] To this end, Brazil has preferred to work through ABACC for verification and inspections as regional authority staffed by members of the state parties. Brazil’s hesitation regarding the NPT Additional Protocol, IAEA inspection access, role as a nuclear materials supplier have not impacted SCCC compliance verified by ABACC.

Regional safeguards regimes hold the potential to promote nonproliferation while empowering states and creating transboundry cooperation. The process that lead to the establishment of ABACC required easing tensions between Argentina and Brazil, however cooperation on the Bilateral Treaty and negotiation of access to each other’s nuclear facilities via a third party mechanism built institutional trust, greatly enhanced relations, and provided the opportunity for further government interaction. Voluntarily binding a government to its main security rival through a framework requiring such open participation provides strategic certainty unlike that of an outside party imposing enforcement on both states. Also, information shared between the state parties via ABACC can be disseminated directly to the governments rather than being handed down through IAEA reporting procedures, and allows the governments to request changes in what and how information is shared. Such information sharing has helped both Argentine and Brazilian national nuclear authorities to improve policies and safeguards designs.

Using existing treaties as frameworks, regional safeguards regimes offer the opportunity for states distrustful of the current global nonproliferation regime, or reluctant to take on full-scope IAEA safeguards to enter into safeguards agreements. Safeguards regimes outside the NPT are not necessarily apt to provide less protection; between the Bilateral Agreement and Quadpartite Agreement, the SCCC imposes more restrictions on the parties than the NPT or LANWFZ treaties.[32] Moreover regional regimes offer a means for states to enter into safeguards of some form while negotiating international treaties– both Argentina and Brazil expressed strong differences with most Latin American states over provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.[33]

Conclusion

Ultimately, no safeguards regime is perfect, nor any framework able to fit all parties. ABACC and the SCCC are the products of years of cooperation between governments balancing political, economic, domestic, and military alignments. The ability of the Argentine and Brazilian governments to bring so many factors to bear and move from strategic rivals to close nonproliferation partners is laudable, and should provide a model for consideration as the international community struggles to deal with rising proliferation threats. Iran currently occupies a similar attitude regarding nuclear weapons and fuel cycle mastery as Brazil during the 1980s. Iran is also attempting to carve a larger position within the international system while actively resisting outside regulation. Regional safeguards regimes may pose an interesting means to incentivize Iran to curtail weapons development. Taking a leadership role in Middle Eastern nonproliferation mechanisms may provide a measure of prestige for the nation, as well as providing a platform to politically pressure nuclear weapon states under their NPT obligations. Such a turnabout would ironic, but not impossible.

Works Cited

Applegarth, Claire. Brazil Permits Greater IAEA Inspection. 19 October 2004. 10 December 2013. <www.armscontrol.org>.

Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials . 2013. 10 December 2013. <www.abacc.org.br>.

“Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).” 1 March 2013. Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 10 December 2013. <http://cns.miis.edu&gt;.

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). 14 February 1967. 10 December 2013. <www.state.gov>.

Graham Jr., Thomas and Damien LaVera. Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control in the Nuclear Era. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002. 10 December 2013.

Graham Jr., Thomas. “Personal Correspondence.” Seattle, 3 January 2012. 10 December 2013.

International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/153: The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Information Circular. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972. 10 December 2013.

International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/395: Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. Information Circular. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1991. 10 December 2013.

International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/435mod1:Agreement of 13 December 1991 Between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency… Information Circular. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997. 10 December 2013.

International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/540: Model Protocol. Information Circular. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997. 10 December 2013.

Marzon, Marco A., Alfredo L. Biaggio and Ana C. Raffo. Nuclear Co-operation in South America: The Brazilian-Argentine common system of safeguards. IAEA Bulletin. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1994. 10 December 2013.

Redick, John R. Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil. Henry L. Stimson Center. Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995. 10 December 2013.

Reiss, Mitchell. Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities. Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 10 December 2013.

Ruhle, Hans. “Brazil and the Bomb.” n.d. DefesaNet. 10 December 2013. <www.defesanet.com.br>.

[1] Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). 14 February 1967. <www.state.gov>.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Graham Jr., Thomas and Damien LaVera. Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control in the Nuclear Era. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002. p. 43.

[7] Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). 2013. p. 1. <www.abacc.org.br>.

[8] Marzon, Marco A., Alfredo L. Biaggio and Ana C. Raffo. Nuclear Co-operation in South America: The Brazilian-Argentine common system of safeguards. IAEA Bulletin. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1994. p. 32.

[9] International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/395: Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. Information Circular. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1991. p. 3.

[10] Ibid, p. 2.

[11] Ibid, p. 3.

[12] Ruhle, Hans. “Brazil and the Bomb.” n.d. DefesaNet. <www.defesanet.com.br>.

[13] Graham Jr., Thomas and Damien LaVera. p. 51.

[14] International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/395. p. 2.

[15] Ibid, p. 4.

[16] Ibid, p. 32.

[17] Marzon, et al. p. 32.

[18] Redick, John R. Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil. Henry L. Stimson Center. Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995. p. 28.

[19] Marzon, et al. p. 34.

[20] Marzon, et al. p. 31.

[21] Redick, p. 26.

[22] International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/395. p. 11.

[23] Redick, p. 28.

[24] “Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).” 1 March 2013. Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. <http://cns.miis.edu&gt;.

[25] Redick, p. 29.

[26] Redick, p. 31.

[27] International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/435mod1:Agreement of 13 December 1991 Between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency… Information Circular. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997. p. 22.

[28] Redick, p. 30.

[29] Applegarth, Claire. Brazil Permits Greater IAEA Inspection. 19 October 2004. <www.armscontrol.org>.

[30] Graham Jr., Thomas. “Personal Correspondence.” Seattle, 3 January 2012.

[31] Applegarth, 2004.

[32] Redick, p. 37.

[33] Ibid, p. 37.